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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The action in the lower Court was brought by the
Executor of the Estate of Nancy E. Hi riga ray, deceased, for
the purpose of setting aside a deed of conveyance to cer,.
tain real property located in Davis County, Utah. The
facts are as follows: the defendant, Archie Findlay, lives
in Blackfoot, Idaho, and is a nephew of the deceased . .
grantor; the deceased, Nancy E. Hirigaray, lived in Layton,
Utah, until just before her death on January 12, 1955; in
the early spring of 1949, the deceased wrote to Archie
Findlay and asked him to come down to help her with
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her property (TRS 19 and 26); on April26, 1949, Archie
Findlay came from Idaho and picked the deceased up in
his car and they went together to the Barnes Banking
Company, Kaysville, Utah, where the deceased executed
a deed (Ex. A.), together with instructions as to how the
property or its proceeds was to be divided upon her death
(TRS 19 and 29); the deed and instructions were left at
the Barnes Banking Company in an envelope marked
"Nancy E. Hirigaray and Archie Findlay" (Ex. C.); on
June 27, 1949, Hirigaray executed another set of instruc. .
tions by which she eliminated two persons named in the
first instructions (Ex. 1.) and picked up the first instruc. .
tions (TRS 37 and 41); on July 11, 1952, Hirigaray went
to the Barnes Banking Company and executed a new set
of instructions (Ex. 2.), and then again on March 15,
1954, Hirigaray again changed her instructions; on the
day of the execution of the deed Hirigaray had Archie
Findlay's name put on two savings accounts in two Salt
Lake City Banks but subsequently put another person's
name on the accounts and removed the name of Archie
Findlay (TRS 22) ; after execution of the deed Archie
Findlay returned to Idaho and did not see the deed or
instructions again until after the death of Hirigaray in
January, 1955.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOWS
CLEARLY THAT THE GRANTOR ON THE DEED
HAD A TESTAMENTARY PLAN IN MIND AND
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY RE. .
QUIREMENTS FOR A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSI. .
TION.
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The basic problem in this action is whether or not the
plaintiff's decedent legally delivered a certain deed dated
April 26, 1949, to the defendant so as to create in him
a then present interest; or whether the decedent really
intended to create a testamentary plan of distribution of
this property, which plan must fail because it did not
conform to the statutory requirements for such plans.
The law of our state in this field is succinctly stated in
the recent case of First Security Bank v. Burgi -U-, 251
P2d 297 ( 1952) which reads in part as follows:
" ( 1) Delivery is essentially a matter involving
intent, and such intent is to be arrived at from the
facts and surrounding circumstances, both before
and after the date of the deed, including declara. .
tions of alleged grantor where it appears the decla. .
rations are made fairly and in ordinary course of
life."
(2) Where father executing deed and bill of
sale in favor of son intended that deed and bill of
sale were to become operative only upon death of
father, the deed and bill of sale were testamentary
in character and intent and were inoperative for
failure to conform to statutory requirements for
testamentary disposition.''
This action is brought by the Executor of the alleged
grantor's estate for the purpose of bringing the property
within the estate and under the jurisdiction of the probate
court. The defendant did not pay anything for the property.
He testified that the decedent asked him to do her a favor
and he said that he would do so. (TRS 19 and 26). The
defendant and decedent went to her bank where a Mr.
Gailey was instructed to prepare a deed form. The decedent
said that she wanted to make a deed to defendant and that
he was to sell the land any time after her death and distri . .
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bute the money to certain designated persons. Even at the
time of trial, defendant did not pretend that there was
any other purpose but to sell the property after decedent's
death and make distribution in accordance with her in.structions (TRS 19, 24, 25 and 27) . The deed was put in
an envelope marked (among other things) with the two
names "Nancy E. Hirigaray and Archie Findlay." A sepa..
rate sheet of instructions as to the distribution of the pro..
ceeds of the sale of her property after her death was also
included in the envelope with the deed. After the deed
was signed and left at the Barnes Banking Company,
Kaysville, Utah, the defendant went back to his home in
Idaho and did not discuss the matter of the property with
decedent again, nor did he inquire at the bank about the
deed until almost a month after decedents death on Janu..
ary 10, 1955, when he obtained the deed and had it re-corded. During the almost six years between the signing
of the deed and its recordation decedent rented the farm
lands, and collected rents, paid the taxes, and did not
even discuss the deed or property with defendant. Further,
the decedent continued to live on the premises and did
all things in relation to said premises to the same extent as
she had done previous to the signing of the deed and gave
no indication of giving up the premises or ceasing to treat
it as her own during her lifetime.
From the time the deed \Vas made until the time of
trial the defendant, Archie Findlay did not claim any in-terest in the real estate. The whole object of his participa.tion in this matter was to accommodate Hirigaray in execut. .
ing a testamentary plan of distribution of the Hirigaray
estate. Just before Hirigaray went to the hospital on \vhat
proved to be her final illness Archie Findlay talked to her
in order "to get it all straightened out as to how she \Vanted
everything divided, the household furniture and stuff, so
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there would be no argument about it later" (TRS 25).
It was in July, 1952, that Hirigaray rewrote her instruc. .
tions as to the distribution of her estate at which time Ar-chie Findlay appears as a distributee for the first time (Ex.
2). The written instructions have an appearance and lan-guage much like that of a codicil to a will - they are
testamentary in tone.
On June 27, 1949, the decedent went to the Barnes
Banking Company and made a set of instructions which
reads in part:
"After my death said Archie Findlay was to
dispose of the property and divided the proceeds
of sale among several others that are mentioned
on a statement made by me on 26th of April, 1949.
Since that time I have given cash to Mrs. Mabel
Timothy and Myrtle Schofield, and for that rea. .
son they are to not have any share of proceeds
coming from the sale of real estate and improve . .
ments and the total shall be divided among the
others mentioned in said statement of April 26,
1949."
At the time of trial the original instruction sheet could
not be produced and its loss being explained by Mr. Gailey
to the effect that Mrs. Hirigaray picked it up on June 27,
1949 (TRS 37).
On July 11, 1952, decedent went to her bank and
had a new set of instructions prepared which read in part
as follows:
"The understanding that I have is that at my
death he is to dispose of the property and the pro . .
ceeds from sale to be divided among the following
persons:
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To Mrs. Ann Jensen of Blackfoot, Idaho, three
hundred dollars; Josephine Avery of Layton, Utah,
five hundred dollars; to Margaret Nord three hun. .
dred dollars; the remainder to be divided equally
among the following named persons: Archie Find. .
lay of Blackfoot, Idaho, William Findlay of Black. .
foot, Idaho, George Findlay of Blackfoot, Idaho,
Mattie Miles of Blackfoot, Idaho, Mrs. Ruth Wil. .
kinson, all of the above being nephews or nieces
of mine, also Arthur Findlay of Layton, Utah,
Stephen T. Findlay of Clearfield, Utah, and Parley
Findlay of Ogden, Utah. In the event that either
of the above die before I do then if they leave any
issue their share to be divided among the children
of deceased."
On March 15, 1954, the decedent altered her instruc. .
tions as follows:
"March 15, 1954. Ben Nord is now dead and
for that reason I ask that his share be divided
equally qmong the others mentioned. That is what
he would have received to be divided among others
as tho he had not been mentioned at all."
The testimony of Mr. Gailey and the defendant did
not disclose any statement of decedent contrary to the
written words of these various instruction sheets (TRS 45).
Defendant candidly admits that decedent told him he
could sell the property "anytime after her death."
A review of the evidence of this case creates and com. .
pels the inesapable conclusion that the decedent had a testa. .
mentary plan and intent in mind when she executed the
deed on April 26, 1949. It is fitting and proper that the
Court declare the decedent's deed null and void and that
the property be delivered to plaintiff to be distributed in ac. .
cordance vvith the orderly and protective procedures of
the probate jurisdiction of our Courts.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY AS
TO WHAT WAS SAID TO THE GRANTOR AT THE
TIME THE DEED WAS MADE.
The problem under this point concerns the evidence
appearing on page 28 of the transcript and similar evi. .
dence appearing on page 36 of the transcript. On page 28,
Archie Findlay was being examined by Rex Hardy as
follows:

Q. Now at the time you were in the bank was there
any discussion about the delivery of this particular deed?
A. Yes, Mr. Gailey explained it to her.
Q. Do you recall what he stated?
Mr. Lowe: I object to the explanation of a third
party, inadmissable, not being the statement of the
deceased or grantor and it certainly would be hear. .
say, this man is not a party.
The Court: Objection overruled.
Later a motion was made to strike all of the testimony
along this· vein (TRS 30). Objection was also made to
similar testimony by Mr. Gailey (TRS 36).
This situation comes squarely within the prohibition
of our "dead man statute" Section 78..-24..-2 (3), UCA 1953.
Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 U. 280, 172 P2d 122
Sine v. Harper, ________u ________ , 222 P2d 571
The testimony of Mr. Gailey would not be inadmis..sable, perhaps, under the "dead man statute" but was a
unilateral statement involving a conclusion of law to which
there was no reply by Hirigaray. On page 45 of the trans..
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cript Rex Hardy was cross. .examining Mr. Gailey concern. .
ing the conversations at the time the deed was prepared.
The following appears:

Q. At the time that this conversation was taking place
did Mrs. Hirigaray make any statement indicating her
understanding as to the need of delivering the deed?
A. I didn't get the last part.

Q. The Court: Did she make any statement to you?
Q. Mr. Hardy: Which would lead you to know, or
indicate what her understanding was?
A. No. She did not!
At the very best this evidence is only admissable as an
admission by silence. The law provides that such evidence
is admissable only when it is a statement of fact (and not
a conclusion of law) and when the statement is heard
and understood by the person whose interest is affected.
31 Corpus Juris Secundum 1057,1060.
The evidence in this case falls far short of being an
admission by silence. The evidence shows that at the very
time of the deed another written instrument provided
that "after her death the property was to be sold and
divided among certain people. Hirigaray exercised her con. .
trol over the property by naming new distributees and
eliminating others upon three subsequent occasions. If Mrs.
Hirigaray considered that she could change the distributees
at her pleasure and eliminate some (or all), then she cer. .
tainly did not intend to relinquish title and control when
the deed. was made.
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CONCLUSION
Certainly the weight of the evidence is to the effect
that the deceased had a testamentary plan in mind at
the time the deed was made, and thus it should be held
to be void in order that the property be made a part of
the decedents estate and be distributed under the orderly
processes of the Courts. It is easy to see that should the
defendant fail to comply with the express will of Mrs.
Hirigaray as contained in her various written instructions,
then a number of Court actions would probably ensue.
The decision of the lower Court should be reversed.
Respectfully Submitted,
PETER M. LOWE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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